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1. Introduction 
 
Although voting is a very private and individual act, social networks directly influence the 
choice made. Ideally, an informed voter casts a vote on the party which is closest to his or her 
vision on society. These underlying values are socially inherited during childhood and 
adolescence from different actors such as parents, peers, school and/or media. In this paper, 
we are interested in the extent to which environment exerts an influence over party 
preference. Environment here is seen as both the social network one is embedded in and the 
geographical context. Instead of focussing on the role of the individual in his party preference, 
we examine if the size and composition of one’s social network, and the municipality of 
residence, plays an additional, constraining role on party preference. Although a lot of the 
research using the social network perspective looks at the political homogeneity of the 
networks, in this analysis we use network indicators as measures of structural social capital.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
Previous research on social networks and voting has stressed the fact that people are 
embedded in networks of people having similar political opinions (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and 
McPhee 1954; Huckfeldt & Sprague 1992). In our research, we restrict the analysis to purely 
structural aspects of social networks, following the approach of Huckfeldt & La Due Lake 
(1998). We consider social ties as the structural aspects of social capital, and we want to 
investigate to what extent social capital enhances the likelihood of preferring one party over 
another.  
 
2.1 Social ties 
 
Social relations lie at the heart of all social sciences. A specific interest in the composition of 
one’s social ties can already be found in work on group affiliations in the early days of 
sociology. According to Simmel (1955), in pre-modern society one’s web of social relations 
was embedded in concentric circles such as family, neighbourhood and workplace. Kinship 
and locality determined one’s social relations to a large extent, and one couldn’t create ties to 
a different social circle without being member of an embedded smaller one. In modern society 
this wasn’t the case anymore, and the individual was seen as the one connecting different 
 3
spheres of social life. One’s family, friends circle, colleagues and religious affiliation are 
loosely connected, and not completely determined by each other.  
More contemporary approaches to social ties want to examine which kind of ties contribute 
most to social cohesion, as fragmentation of society and is seen as the cause of many 
problems, such as crime, isolation and suicide. From this perspective, two types of ties can be 
discerned: bridging and bonding ties.  
 
2.1.1 Bonding Ties 
One of the general laws of social networks is that birds of a feather flock together (Lazarsfeld 
& Merton, 1954). People with similar backgrounds, living in the same region, with similar 
opinions, have a larger chance of knowing each other than people with different backgrounds, 
living in different regions, with different opinions. The observation that similarity breeds 
connection, has been documented in a number of intimate life domains such as marriage, 
friendship, residency, religious affiliation… (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001). The 
social capital that is generated in these homogenous networks is often coined bonding social 
capital. Bonding capital could be traced back to the kind of solidarity Durkheim (1915) 
associated with participation in community rituals, for him the key to social integration. The 
solidarity is only extended to group members, and it entails mostly emotional support, and 
focuses on the needs and interests of group members. We can see the bonding ties as support 
networks, or “those social interactions and relationships that provide individuals with actual 
assistance or with a feeling of attachment to a person or a group that is perceived as caring 
and loving” (Hobfoll & Stokes, 1988). Social support has been shown to have an important 
direct relation with both higher subjective wellbeing and better mental and physical health 
(Ensel & Lin, 1991; Berkman & Syme, 1979). Next to that, social support functions as a 
buffer to various stressors and has an indirect effect as well (LaRocco‚ House ‚ & French‚ 
1980; Cobb, 1976). Conceptually social support can be divided in a number of different 
aspects : emotional, instrumental, informational support.  
These strong ties are formed within the groups and communities, which already gives a hint at 
the problems associated with the bonding capital: groups and communities are often 
exclusive. Furthermore, since it occurs in homogenous groups, it can be parochial and inward-
looking, and the tight bonds of trust may prevent members from reaching their full potential 
(Portes & Landolt, 1996). Thick trust is generated by intensive, regular contact between 
people, making social control possible (Coleman, 1988). The expectation of reciprocity 
inherent to social capital also means that those who will not be able to repay, will not be 
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granted favours. Burt (2000), characterises the kind of social capital generated by networks 
were everyone knows everyone, also known as network closure, information flows very 
easily, and social norms are strong, as social cohesion.  
 
2.1.2 Bridging ties 
Next to strong ties within groups, ties between social groups play an important role as 
generators of social capital (Woolcock, 1998). Granovetter (1973) states in a seminal study 
that the strength of a tie is inversely related to the homogeneity of both parties involved. 
These weak ties link members of different social groups, and are therefore the basis for 
integration in contemporary society (Newton, 1997). Building bridges between different 
circles can also be beneficial for the individual. These holes in the social structure create 
opportunities for the ones building the bridges, or in other words, the network brokers (Burt, 
1992). If one has access to different kinds of networks, one can control the flow of 
information from one network to another. The most valuable network resources are the ones 
who come from a different relatively closed network. Furthermore linking ties also prevent 
the negative outcomes of too much “social glue”, like prejudice towards others, and widen the 
perspective through contact with others (Allport, 1954). Since diversity in society is growing 
at a very fast rate, bridging social ties are seen as an effective tool to handle these differences. 
Since diversity is a relatively vague term, it may be helpful to distinguish between different 
forms of bridging ties. Identity bridging ties are links between culturally defined group 
differences such as ethnicity, sexual preference, religion, etc., while status bridging ties are 
associated with the socio-economic stratification of society (Wuthnow, 2002). It is clear that 
the conceptual division between bonding and bridging ties gives insight into the mechanisms 
of social capital generation. Both are necessary, or as Putnam (2000) states that bonding 
capital is good to “get by”, but bridging capital allows one to “get ahead”. 
 
2.1.3 Social ties and politics 
In general the approach we use leans heavily on the seminal work about the influence of 
context and networks on political behaviour and attitudes, “The social logic of politics” by 
Zuckerman (2005).  
From the political communication perspective, Huckfeldt et al. (1995) noted that political 
opinion transmission depends to a large extent on the microenvironment, or the social 
networks one has. Those who are more politically integrated, also have more chances for 
extensive social interaction, and are more likely to experience the larger climate of political 
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opinions. Previous research has illustrated that social capital plays a significant role, over both 
human capital and organizational involvement, in political participation (Huckfeldt & La Due 
Lake 1998).  
 
2.2 Context 
Although socialisation literature is all about context, geography is rarely added to the analysis 
of electoral systems of proportional representation. It is widely documented in studies on 
party preferences in majority systems (e.g. Gainsborough 2001; Johnston & Pattie 2006; 
Walks 2005). We are interested in the municipality as context, since it can be expected that 
the municipality context has some influence on party preference. Living in a municipality that 
has a large immigrant population, could trigger sensitivity for immigration issues that are not 
so tangible in a rural village.  
A second point is that presence is a first condition for social contact (Blau, 1977), or stated 
differently, “personal network are the result of individual choices made within the constraints 
of the context” (Fischer et al,.1977 in Mollenhorst, Völker & Flap, 2008). We can see the 
municipality as this context that constrains or opens up the possibilities for social ties.  
 
3. Data & Contextualisation:  
 
3.1 The data  
Since we want to test these hypotheses on the Flemish population, a complete network design 
is impossible, but egocentric network measures in surveys can provide robust and 
representative information (Marsden, 1990). We will use data from the Social Cohesion 
Indicators Flanders (SCIF) Survey. The SCIF-survey is a representative survey of respondents 
in Flanders between 18 and 85 years old. The SCIF survey was conducted in the northern 
autonomous region of Flanders, with 6,162,000 inhabitants or 58 per cent of the total Belgian 
population. A face-to–face interview methodology was chosen since this method of interview 
allows for longer interviews and more reliable answers on complicated measurement 
instruments. In total, 2,080 respondents participated in the survey. The interviews were 
carried out between the April and July 2009.  
 
The survey was designed specifically to analyse the impact of community level characteristics 
on individual quality of life outcomes. To select the respondents, two-stage cluster sampling 
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was used. First, groups of communities were identified that differ minimally within and 
maximally between groups. This cluster analysis was performed using community level 
indicators of population density and mobility, industrial production, economic performance 
and demographic indicators1. From the resulting clusters, 40 municipalities were randomly 
drawn, with their selection chances dependent on their population figure. This procedure was 
used to ensure a sufficient variation of relevant indicators on the community level. In a second 
phase, a simple random sample of inhabitants born between 1924 and 1991, living in the 
selected municipalities, was drawn from the official national registry (including both Belgian 
citizens and foreign nationals). Overall, the survey obtained a response rate of 54 per cent, 
which can be considered as average for this kind of research in a Belgian context. A response 
analysis indicated that respondents are representative for the population of these 40 
municipalities, with no significant differences between participants and the population with 
regard to age and gender. The resulting dataset, in sum, includes information on 2,080 
respondents, nested in 40 distinct municipalities. This nested design allows us to test the 
impact of community level variables on individual outcomes in a methodologically correct 
manner, with sufficient cases both on the first (individual) and second (community) 
observation level (SCIF 2009). 
 
To have a parsimonious measure of variables that can explain differences between 
communities in Flanders, we did a factor analysis on 18 important structural indicators (see 
also Hooghe, Vanhoutte & Bircan 2009). A wide range of demographic, socio-economic, 
criminological and spatial planning indicators are used (see factor matrix in appendix). 
Although the scores were calculated for all 308 Flemish municipalities based on data from 
2005, in the analyses we evidently only use the scores for the municipalities that were 
included in the SCIF-survey. The factoranalysis provides 5 Factors, that comprise 90.29% of 
the total variance2. The dimensions are solid indicators on the municipality level for 
urbanization, population mobility and immigration, population density, economic wellbeing 
and the ageing of the population. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The Flemish region is divided in 308 municipalities, with on average ca. 20,000 inhabitants. 
The municipalities have a large degree of autonomy with regard to housing, social affairs, 
environment, land use, poverty reduction, etc. 
2 For an overview of the indicators used and the factormatrix: see appendix 
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Table 1: Frequencies and characteristics of municipality-level variables 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Urbanity 40 1.675 3.797 -0.355 13.912 
Population Mobility 40 0.034 0.697 -0.631 2.698 
Population density 40 0.098 0.801 -1.057 2.903 
Economic Wellbeing 40 -0.249 0.865 -2.236 2.660 
Ageing of the population 40 -0.015 0.888 -2.195 3.517 
 
 
3.2 Political Landscape 
As a consociational democracy, a typical feature of the political context is that it is compose 
out of many parties, which are represented proportionally if they have a larger share of the 
vote than the 5% threshold.. In the elections closest to our time of data-collection, the regional 
elections of 2009, seven different parties were represented. A second typical feature is that 
voting is obligatory in Belgium. In our analysis, we will take into account the 4 largest parties 
in our survey, excluding those that did not reach 10% of our sample excluding the missings. 
These parties are the centre-oriented Christian-democrats (CD&V), the center-left social-
democratic party (sp.a), the center-right liberal party (OpenVLD) and the extreme right anti-
immigrant Vlaams Belang (VB). These four parties can be seen as the ones that have 
dominated politics in the last 20 years. With the exception of VB, they were all in a 
government coalition for at least two terms.  
 
We will analyse the party preference in a binary way, looking only at the respondents who 
have a party preference, which still is 85% of our sample. The question we used to measure 
party preference is “Which party would you vote for if a regional election were to be held on 
Sunday?” 
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Table 2: Frequency and percentage of party preferences in survey and share of the vote in closest actual 
elections (n=1753) 
 Frequency Percentage 
(including) 
Share of the vote 2009 
CDV 498 23.94 22.86 
N-VA 145 6.97 13.06 
SP.a 279 13.41 15.27 
Open VLD 304 14.62 14.99 
Groen! 172 8.27 6.77 
Vlaams 
Belang 
177 
8.51 
15.28 
Lijst 
Dedecker 
165 
7.93 
7.62 
SLP 13 0.63 1.09 
Other party or 
missing 
327 15.72 3.06 
 
Looking at the results of our survey in comparison with the real election results, we note that 
for most parties the party preference on the base of the surevy is not too far away from the 
actual results in the elections. Only two parties differ significantly from the vote share, the VB 
and the NVA. The voters of the VB are known not to disclose their party affiliation easily. 
This rightwing party had to change name because they were convicted for racism, and they 
have been excluded from every from of coalition government by the other parties by the so-
called ‘cordon sanitaire’. In commercial election surveys that are weighted by party 
affiliation, usually they have a weight of around 2 or 3. The lower proportion of NVA voters 
than in the real population is more difficult to explain. In the last election of 2010, this party 
almost doubled it’s vote share. Their main issue is more independence, and thus also more 
budget and more decisive power for the Flemish regional parliament in the framework of the 
Belgian federal state. Since the country has been in a number of consecutive crises on some 
technical issues relating to the constitutional makeup of the country, it could be that the 
charismatic leader of the NVA won a lot of voters in these turbulent times, giving them an 
alternative solution to a problem the traditional parties weren’t able to solve.  
 
3.3 Network measures 
Network analysis has established itself as a field on its own in the last decades. Although we 
are analysing networks, we are not doing network analysis. This is related to the nature of the 
data. Where network analysis studies the relations in a closed setting, e.g. a classroom, taking 
into account the characteristics of the actors, we use a sample from the target population. A 
second point of interest is that we only have egocentric network measures, which means that 
we have information about the relation ego has to alters, but not about the relations alters 
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have. From a network perspective we are missing a key point of information, since we do not 
know the degree of closure, or in other words if friends know each other. These survey on the 
other do allow us to make generalisations on the Flemish population and their social 
networks, which is never possible if one studies complete networks.  
 
To have a look at bonding social ties we investigate the number of friends and family one can 
discuss personal matters with, and the intensity of these contacts. The amount of bridging 
social ties is examined by looking at the diversity of one’s social circle in cultural, socio-
economical and resourcebased terms. 
 
3.3.1 Core network size 
Studies show that estimates in surveys for the total network size are unreliable (Killsworth et 
al., 1990), but experiments teach us that the average total network size is about 125 (Dunbar 
& Hill, 2003). Since our interest lies in the extent of strong ties, associated with bonding 
social capital, we are less more interested in the size of the close network, that reflects actual 
social support, than the total network. We asked the respondents with how many people they 
talked about personal matters in their family and among their friends, which is a reliable 
estimate of the size of one’s intimate, close social network (Marsden, 1990). The size of the 
close network can be seen as an indicator for emotional social support (Pugliesi & Shook, 
1998), and it is a common measure for core discussion networks (Mollenhorst, Völker & Flap 
2008). To avoid outliers and keep the size of the networks realistic, we limited the maximum 
number of friend and family one talks to about personal matters to 18. 
 
 
3.3.2 Frequency of contact with the close network 
A second aspect of bonding network ties is the frequency of contact. Strong ties form through 
frequent contact (Homans, 1955), so the frequency of contact with the close network is a 
second good and reliable indicator of bonding (Marsden, 1989). The indicator for intensity of 
close network contact is the sum of two items, visiting family and inviting friends. These 
items had a 6 point scale of frequency ranging from never (0) to several times a week (5). 
In our sample the mean frequency of contact was 5.56 with a standard deviation of 2.09, and 
the median 6, which means on average people visit family and friends a few times a month. 
We have to keep in mind that we are talking about the closest friends, namely the ones you 
invite at home, and the family members that are visited.  
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3.3.3 Identity diversity of wider network 
 
Not only the socio-economic diversity of one’s network was mapped, but diversity of one’s 
friend circle in terms of religion, ethnic background, sexual orientation, generation and 
political ideas was probed in a more direct way. 
  
The exact question wording was: Think about your friends (and not only your best friends). 
Do you have a friend … ? 
 With a different religious orientation? 
 With a different ethnic background? 
 With a different sexual orientation? 
 Of a different generation (at least 20 years of difference) ? 
 With different political ideas? 
 
The respondents were asked to answer with a simple yes or no. 
 
Table 3: Frequencies items network diversity 
Items % yes 
With a different religious orientation? (n=2055) 43.26 
With a different ethnic background? (n=2074) 38.04 
With a different sexual orientation? (n=2072) 44.74 
Of a different generation (at least 20 years of difference) ? 
(n=2075) 
52.77 
With different political ideas? (n=1972) 72.26 
 
We observe that having a friend with different political ideas is quite frequent, but a friend 
with a different ethnic background is less common. To identify the structure of the answering 
patterns, we use item response theory (IRT). Shortly stated IRT states that the score of a 
respondent on a scale is determined by a latent trait, in this case the diversity of their network. 
Each item holds a position on the latent trait, with an associated degree of difficulty, a 
threshold. Every respondent also holds a position on the latent trait. If the position of the 
respondent on the latent trait is high, but the item has a low difficulty threshold, then the 
respondent has a high chance of answering positively on the item. In the context of the 
network diversity scale this means that a respondent with a very diverse network, will 
probably have people with a different political opinion in his network.  
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To examine the scale we used mokken scale analysis (Mokken, 1971; Sijtsma & Molenaar, 
2002). This is an extension of a guttman scale using probability, which means that the scale 
can be ordered so that a positive answer on item means that all the previous items were also 
answered positively with a high propability. For every item and for the total scale an H value 
is calculated, with reflects the scalability of the item, and the validity of the total scale. The 
item H should always be higher than .30. If the scale H has a value above .50, the scale is very 
strong, if it is lower than .40 the scale is very weak. The scale is a moderately strong 
unidimensional mokken scale , with a scale H of .40.  
 
Table 4: Item and scale characteristics identity diversity (N=1953) 
Items (0=no friend, 1= friend) Scale 
mean
Item H 
People with different political ideas .72 .50 
People of a different generation (at least 20 years of 
difference)  
.53 .32 
People with a different sexual orientation .45 .37 
People with a different religious orientation .43 .42 
People with a different ethnic background .38 .45 
ScaleH=.40 
 
Diversity in terms of political ideas seems quite easy to cope with among friends. Knowing 
people of a different generation is a bit more difficult, but still widespread in the Flemish 
population. The items about a different sexual and a different religious orientation are very 
close to each other in terms of difficulty. This may be due to the fact that the religious 
diversity in Belgium is very limited, with the majority being formally Roman Catholic. Ethnic 
diversity remains the most difficult item in the scale. 
Since the mokken analysis showed us a cumulative unidimensional scale, a cumulative 
mokken scale ranging from 0 to 5 was constructed. The mean of this scale is 3.22 with a 
standard deviation of 1.81. This means that on average people in Flanders have friends with a 
different political opinion, of a different generation and of a different sexual orientation. 
 
3.3.4 Socio-economic diversity of wider network 
To measure the linkage of respondents with different social circles in society, we used the 
position generator. The position generator is an instrument to grasp the ego-centered network 
of an individual based on the occupations of their network contacts. It was first used in the 
Albany study (Lin & Dumin, 1986). The version we used is a shortened version (20 items 
instead of 30), adapted to the Flemish context, of the position generator used in the 1999 
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survey the social networks of the Dutch (SSND). Their measure was based on earlier research 
by Boxman et al (1991), Moerbeek (2001), Völker (1995) and Völker & Flap (1999). Tie 
strength, or if the person having the occupation was either family, a friend or an acquaintance, 
was not taken into account.  
 
The wording of the question was: “With which occupations do you have contact in daily life? 
Do you know a ….in your family ? Or among your friends? or acquaintances? 
 
Since in this study we are mainly interested in the diversity of the ties, we will use one of the 
most simple, straightforward and parsimonious measures derived in the context of social 
capital from the position generator, namely the number of accessed positions (Van der Gaag, 
Snijders & Flap, 2003). The respondents in the survey on average had access to 11 
occupations through their network, with a standard deviation of 4.33.  
 
3.3.5 Resource diversity of the wider network 
Socio-economic diversity of the network on itself is not so useful if you cannot mobilise any 
resources. The respondent is asked if he can ask someone in his social circle to help him out 
with a number of both practical, technical and legal issues. This because knowing people in 
different socio-economical positions does not mean you can actually mobilise their resources. 
In terms of politics, this gives us a deeper view of the actual diversity of resource one can 
access through his or her network (Van der gaag, Snijders & Flap 2004). Again we use a 
simple measure, and make use of a dichotomy: having acces to the resource through the 
network, or not having access. Using mokken scale analysis, we examined if a cumulative 
structure was present in the data. Only one item did not load on the resource diversity scale, 
the item that asked if one knows someone who can repair a car or motorcycle in his network.  
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Table 5: Frequency and Loevinger H of Resource generator scale item 
Item % yes 
Loevin
ger H 
Active in a political party 0.4649 0.40 
Can help you find a job 0.6548 0.39 
Who can lend you 1000 euro 0.8187 0.33 
Knows about financial affairs (taxes, subsidy, ..) 0.8341 0.31 
Of whom you can use the car 0.8394 0.35 
Who knows how to handle a pc 0.9577 0.49 
Who can help you move 0.9764 0.51 
Total scale H=.37 
 
Looking at the difficulty of having certain resources, we note that someone to help with 
practical issues such as moving and ICT is more common than assistance with mobility, 
assistance with taxes and actual financial assistance. Connections to find a job, or people who 
are active in politics are the least common resources. All in all the scale has a H of .37 which 
means it is a valid but rather weak cumulative scale.  
 
Table 6: Correlations of the different network measures (n=1938) 
 Size of 
close 
network 
Intensity 
of close 
network 
contact 
Cultural 
diversity 
Socio 
economic 
diversity 
Resource 
diversity 
Size of close network 1     
Intensity of close network 
contact 
0.2557 1    
Cultural diversity 0.1396 0.1715 1   
Socioeconomic diversity 0.2584 0.2197 0.3337 1  
Resource diversity 0.2312 0.2251 0.232 0.4405 1
 
We will use these five measures of social networks separately. Every indicator measures a 
different aspect of the social connectedness. In theory these measures could coincide, but the 
correlations in table 3 show that this is not the case. As was to be expected, the measures for 
bridging social networks are related, but clearly measure different aspects that deserve to be 
analysed apart. Size and frequency of contact of the close social network are positively 
related, but not very strongly. The correlations between bridging and bonding measurements 
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are all lower, which demonstrates the validity of the theoretical separation between both 
concepts. 
 
4. Analysis 
 
A first description of the differences between the contexts of respondents preferring different 
partners, is given in the table below. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive results of party preference and network indicators 
 Socialist 
Party 
Christian 
Democrats  
Extreme 
Right  
Number of good friends 3.2 3 2.2 
Number of family members one is close to 4 4.7 3.2 
Percentage having friends with different ethnic 
background 
45% 30% 34% 
Percentage knowing someone in a politcial 
party?  
45.5% 49.6% 34.5% 
 
Clearly, already on the individual level there are differences between respondents having a 
different party preference in our sample. Where Christian Democrats have a larger family 
base to rely on, supporters of the extreme right clearly have a smaller close network in 
general. Socialist typically have a more diverse network in cultural terms, whereas Christian 
democrats can acces a wide variety of resources.  
 
To disentangle community level and individual level influences, multilevel logit regressions 
are used, in a random intercept model. A multilevel model, also named hierarchical model or 
random effects model, makes it possible to assess community level influences apart from 
individual level influences. The logit version of multilevel is slightly different from a usual 
multilevel with a normally distributed response variable, since the variance on the individual 
level depends on the value of the predictors in the regression, and the usual assumption of 
homoscedasticity does not hold for logit regression. Looking how much of the total variance 
is on each level becomes rather difficult because of that. The use of a threshold model is 
commonly used as an easy way to asses higher level variance. In practice this means we 
constrain the individual level variance to 1 (Goldstein, Brown & Rasbash, 2002). Two 
measures of model fit will be used, a basic indicator of model fit, the squared correlation and 
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a measure more adapted to logit regression, a pseudo R square measure based on the log 
likelihood.  
For the convenience of the reader the B-coefficients have been transformed to odds-ratios, 
since they are a lot easier to interpret than logit coefficients.  
 
In the analysis we will add variables step by step, starting with a zero multilevel model, that 
only has a random intercept. By adding information about the social background, the social 
networks and the municipality of residence, we will try to explain the propensity to support 
the party over other parties.  
 
Table 8: Logistic Multilevel Analysis of party preference for the Christian Democratic Party versus other 
parties. (n=1753) 
  Christian Democrats 
  1 2 3 4
Demographic 
background 
Age  1.023 *** 1.024 *** 1.025 *** 
Gender 
(Ref. Male) 
 1.373 ** 1.317 * 1.318 * 
Diploma  0.953 ns .949 ns .965 ns 
Social networks Size close 
network 
  1.041 ** 1.041 ** 
Intensity 
close network 
  1.061 ns 1.053 ns 
Cultural 
diversity 
  .889 ** .906 ** 
Socio-
economic 
diversity 
  1.021 ns 1.015 ns 
Resourse 
diversity 
  1.009 ns 1.008 ns 
Community level Urbanity    .915 ** 
Migration    1.050 ns 
Density    .780 ** 
Economic 
wellbeing 
   .897 ns 
Age structure    .941 ns 
ICC  0.0533 0.0563 0.0583 0.0175
LL  -1029.07 -990.5 -906.04 -895.77
Squared 
correlation 
 .0376 .0506 .0741
Pseudo R squared   .0375 .1196 .1295 
Entries are odds ratios of the logistic multilevel regression. Data: SCIF-survey 2009.  
Sign.: ns p>=.05 *:p<.05 **:p<.01 ***:p<.001 
 
On the individual level it’s clear that especially older or female respondents tend to affiliate 
with the Christian Democratic party CD&V. Educational attainment does not play a role. 
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People who support CD&V have a slightly larger close network, but a less culturally diverse 
network.  
A significant influence of the municipality of residence can be noted. It not explained away 
by the composition of our sample, but mainly by urbanity and density. This means that people 
living in an urban and densely inhabited environment are less inclined to vote for this rather 
traditional party. A large share of the municipality level variance is explained away by our 
community level variables. All in all we can predict the propensity to vote for the Christian 
Democrats rather well based on demographics, social network characteristics and 
municipality of residence. Demographics and network indicators seem slightly more 
important, but overall all three parts add to the puzzle. 
 
Table 9: Logistic Multilevel Analysis of party preference for the Social Democratic Party versus other 
parties. (n=1753) 
  Social Democrats 
  1 2 3 4
Demographic 
background 
Age  .991 * .992 ns .992 ns 
Gender  1.170 ns 1.150 ns 1.162 ns 
Diploma  .798 * .805 * .819 * 
Social networks Size close 
network 
  
1.008 ns 1.009 ns 
Intensity 
close network 
  
1.013 ns 1.014 ns 
Cultural 
diversity 
  
1.174 ** 1.160 ** 
Socio-
economic 
diversity 
  
.940 ** .942 ** 
Resourse 
diversity 
  
1.005 ns 1.029 ns 
Community level urbanity    1.071 *** 
migration    1.100 ns 
density    1.024 ns 
economic 
wellbeing 
  
 .748 ** 
age structure    .993 ns 
icc  0.0562 0.0514 0.0459 0 
LL  -759.59 -744.39 -689.74 -678.79 
Squared 
correlation 
 
 .0065 .0226 .0445 
Pseudo R squared   .0200 .0920 .1064 
Entries are odds ratios of the logistic multilevel regression. Data: SCIF-survey 2009.  
Sign.: ns p>=.05 *:p<.05 **:p<.01 ***:p<.001 
 
The people who would vote for the centre left SPA are younger and have a lower educational 
attainment. The age effect also disappears once we include the social network indicators. 
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Socialdemocrats have a culturally diverse, but socioeconomically more homogenic social 
network. On the municipality level it’s clear that they usually live in a more urban, but less 
economically affluent environment. All in all, most of the prediction comes from social 
network indicators and the municipality of residence. Ironically the position in society plays a 
very modest role in predicting a socialist vote. This can be explained because the party aims at 
two entirely different audiences, both the higher educated urban population and the traditional 
workers. Again network indicators contribute most to the pseudo R square, showing that 
preference for the social democrats is strongly related to heterogeneous networks in terms of 
identity, but a smaller scope when it comes to access to diverse resources.  
 
Table 10: Logistic Multilevel Analysis of party preference for the Liberal Party versus other parties. 
(n=1753) 
  Liberals 
  1 2 3 4
Demographic 
background 
Age  1.004 ns 1.005 ns 1.005 ns 
Gender  1.015 ns 1.037 ns 1.033 ns 
Diploma  1.225 * 1.229 * 1.215 * 
Social networks Size close 
network 
  
.973 ns .973 ns 
Intensity 
close network 
  
1.014 ns 1.018 ns 
Cultural 
diversity 
  
.904 * .900 * 
Socio-
economic 
diversity 
  
1.019 ns 1.020 ns 
Resourse 
diversity 
  
1.221 * 1.216 * 
Community level urbanity    1.015 ns 
migration    1.013 ns 
density    1.044 ns 
economic 
wellbeing 
  
 1.288 * 
age structure    1.001 ns 
Icc  0.0598 0.0582 0.0587 0.0475 
LL  -799.35 -789.33 -735.23 -732.47 
Squared 
correlation 
 
 .0044 .0137 .0196 
Pseudo R square   .0125 .0802 .0837 
Entries are odds ratios of the logistic multilevel regression. Data: SCIF-survey 2009.  
Sign.: ns p>=.05 *:p<.05 **:p<.01 ***:p<.001 
 
Respondents supporting for the liberal party are clearly higher educated. Furthermore they 
have more homogenous networks in cultural terms, but access to a high variety of resources. 
In this regard their profile is the opposite of socialists. Furthermore, they tend to live more in 
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economically well-off municipalities. All in all, the network indicators seem to contribute 
most to the model.   
 
Table 11: Logistic Multilevel Analysis of party preference for the Extreme Right versus other parties. 
(n=1753) 
  Extreme right 
  1 2 3 4
Demographic 
background 
Age  .988 ** .982 ** .983 ** 
Gender  .820 ns .808 ns .821 ns 
Diploma  .543 *** .665 ** .679 ** 
Social networks Size close 
network 
  
.916 *** .917 *** 
Intensity 
close network 
  
1.011 ns 1.006 ns 
Cultural 
diversity 
  
.969 ns .965 ns 
Socio-
economic 
diversity 
  
.978 ns .978 ns 
Resourse 
diversity 
  
.816 ** .829 * 
Community level urbanity    1.022 ns 
migration    1.057 ns 
density    .917 ns 
economic 
wellbeing 
  
 .782 * 
age structure    1.066 ns 
Icc  0.0212 0.0074 0 0 
LL  -572.91 -549.85 -505.27 -502.14 
Squared 
correlation 
 
 .0192 .0398 .0434 
Pseudo R squared   .0403 .1181 .1235 
Entries are odds ratios of the logistic multilevel regression. Data: SCIF-survey 2009.  
Sign.: ns p>=.05 *:p<.05 **:p<.01 ***:p<.001 
 
The supporters of the extreme rightwing VB are younger and especially less educated than the 
average voter. The odds to vote for VB are about twice as high if you have a lower 
educational attainment. It seems supporters of the extreme right have a smaller close network, 
and they can’t acces a large variety of resources in their wider network. Oddly enough, they 
do not have a less culturally diverse network. Including network measures also diminishes the 
influence of educational attainment, which points out the importance of the social 
environment for political choices. Another feature of VB voters is that there does not seem to 
be a large higher level influence. This is rather remarkable, since it was the case for the other 
preferences we studied on the one hand, and because we would expect a higher sensitivity for 
their anti-immigrant message in environments with more immigration. This is clearly not the 
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case. This points out that supporting the extreme right mainly can be explained by social 
background and social network indicators.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
This analysis illustrates that party preference does not depend on ideas alone, but that social 
structures such as socio-demographic background, the social networks one is embedded in 
and the kind of municipality where one lives play a significant and sometimes underestimated 
role. The typical supporter of the Christian Democratic Party, is a bit older, female, has a 
large close network to rely on, does not know so many people who are different from herself, 
and tends to live in a more rural, quiet municipality. For Social democrats, this is not the case. 
They tend to be younger and lower educated, have a diverse network in terms of cultural 
differences, but their networks do not span all of the social layers in society. Supporters of the 
Socialists also tend to live in more urban and less economically well-off municipalities. 
People who would vote for the Liberal party are highly educated, but do not have a very 
diverse network in cultural terms. They typically have access to a wide variety of resources, 
which illustrates their entrepreneurial spirit. Liberal Supporters tend to live in richer 
municipalities. The supporters of the extreme right have a distinct demographical profile 
which has already been pointed out several times: they are younger and lower educated. The 
analysis of our findings regarding their networks is rather enlighting and can be considered 
new. First of all, they do not seem to have a less diverse network than the average inhabitant, 
as is sometimes stated in contact-theories on ethnocentrism. Secondly the network indicators 
on which they do differ from the rest of the population are rather important. They tend to have 
a smaller close network, which illustrates social isolation and lack of emotional support. 
Furthermore, they do not have access to diverse resources through their network, which points 
out that the social isolation is not only of an emotional, but also of a practical nature.  
All in all we can say that party preference can be predicted moderately well, without taking 
personal attitudes into account. The models have an acceptable model fit, and especially 
indicators of one’s social network seem to yield more insight into the differences between 
supporters of different parties. Preference for the Christian democrats depends most on 
demographic background, while, social network indicators add around 7% of explained 
variance for about every party. The municipality of residence is again most relevant for the 
Christian democrats.  
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7. Appendix 
 
Rotated Factor Matrix 
  Factor 
  Urbanity  Population 
Mobility 
Population 
density 
Economic 
Wellbeing 
Ageing of the 
population 
Number of Active 
Firms ,980 ,046 ,144 -,060 ,029 
Total Population ,969 ,060 ,182 -,085 ,004 
number of available 
infrastructures 
(culture) 
,967 ,049 ,134 -,066 ,065 
Number of self-
employed persons 
in main profession  
,966 ,051 ,143 -,038 ,064 
Number of 
employees in the 
tertiary sector 
,960 ,080 ,192 -,069 ,007 
Number of 
employees in the 
public sector 
,941 ,073 ,173 -,081 ,017 
Total foreigners 
rate per 1000 
inhabitants 
,042 ,949 ,112 -,074 -,120 
External 
Immigration Rate  ,141 ,938 ,059 -,065 -,070 
External 
Emigration Rate ,019 ,931 ,082 ,133 -,020 
Population Density ,200 ,084 ,913 ,066 ,073 
Percentage of built 
surface ,058 ,045 ,873 ,172 -,031 
Percentage of 
industries and port 
surface 
,383 ,055 ,738 -,077 ,048 
Crime Rate ,376 ,241 ,570 -,165 ,248 
Interquartile 
Coefficient -,046 ,062 -,027 ,909 ,014 
Mean Income -,069 ,079 ,207 ,879 -,015 
Unemployment 
Rate ,214 ,384 ,117 -,614 ,187 
Mean Age ,031 -,119 ,036 -,051 ,947 
Rate of retired 
people over active 
population 
,051 -,052 ,095 -,035 ,891 
Eigenvalue 7.136 2.980 2.483 2.139 1.514 
Principal Factor Analysis with Varimax rotation 
 
 
